Unpacking The Thakkar v. Parikh Case: A Deep Dive Into Fraud, Punitive Damages, And Judge Dillard’s Concurrence

By George Creal, Georgia Personal Injury Lawyer

On June 5, 2025, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a significant ruling in Thakkar v. Parikh (A25A0588, A25A0589), a case that blends complex business dealings, allegations of fraud, and a staggering punitive damages award. In this post we summarize the case, break down the court’s findings, and provide an in-depth analysis of Presiding Judge Dillard’s concurrence dubitante, which raises provocative questions about the constitutional limits of punitive damages. As a Georgia personal injury lawyer, I aim to make this accessible to both legal professionals and curious readers while highlighting the case’s implications for fraud and damages in business disputes.

Case Background: A Tale Of Broken Promises

At its core, Thakkar v. Parikh is a fraud case rooted in a soured business relationship between Dr. Naresh Parikh, a cardiologist, and Chittranjan Thakkar, the manager of Green Chillies, LLC. The dispute centered on three restaurants, Gyro City (Hiram), Gyro City (Roswell), and Santorini Taverna, owned through a labyrinth of holding companies tied to Green Chillies and Gyro City Mediterranean, LLC.

Parikh, who had developed a friendship with Thakkar, alleged that Thakkar induced him to invest heavily in these restaurants with the promise of a one-third ownership stake. Parikh’s investments included $145,000 in promissory notes (personally guaranteed by Thakkar) and approximately $2 million to cover restaurant expenses. However, Thakkar neither repaid the notes nor transferred any ownership interest to Parikh. Parikh further claimed that Thakkar diverted some of these funds to his personal business, Jax Fairfield, LLC.

The case went to a jury trial, where Parikh presented evidence, including emails from Thakkar acknowledging the need to “correct ownership docs” to reflect Parikh’s stake. Thakkar, on the other hand, offered no witnesses or evidence, relying solely on his own testimony, which the court described as “highly conflicting.” For example, Thakkar admitted he had the ability to transfer ownership interests “for the right commitments” but later claimed he lacked such power, only to then assert he had “exclusive control” over the restaurants.

The jury found in favor of Parikh, awarding:

• $145,000 against Thakkar for unpaid promissory notes.
• $650,000 jointly against Thakkar and Green Chillies for fraud.
• $525,025.36 in attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11.
• $65,000,000 in punitive damages, also jointly against Thakkar and Green Chillies.

Thakkar and Green Chillies (collectively “Defendants”) appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the fraud evidence, the admissibility of certain testimony, the attorney fees award, and the constitutionality of the punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s findings on the promissory notes, fraud, and attorney fees but vacated the punitive damages award, remanding the case for further proceedings due to its “grossly excessive” nature under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

The Court’s Analysis: Key Holdings

The Court of Appeals, led by Chief Judge Mercier, addressed the Defendants’ arguments in four divisions. Here’s a breakdown of the key holdings:

1. Sufficiency Of Evidence For Fraud

The Defendants argued that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the fraud claim, asserting insufficient evidence. The court disagreed, applying the standard that it must affirm if any evidence supports the jury’s verdict (Patterson-Fowlkes v. Chancey, 291 Ga. 601, 602 (2012)).

To prove fraud in Georgia, a plaintiff must show: (1) a false representation, (2) scienter (knowledge of falsity), (3) intent to induce action or inaction, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) damages (Coe v. Proskauer Rose, 314 Ga. 519, 526-527 (2022)). The court found ample evidence:

• Parikh’s Testimony: Parikh testified that Thakkar personally promised him a one-third ownership stake in exchange for investments, a promise Thakkar failed to honor despite Parikh’s $2 million-plus investment.
• Thakkar’s Admissions: Thakkar admitted he could transfer ownership interests but chose not to, undermining his claim that he lacked authority.
• Corroborating Evidence: Emails from Thakkar, including instructions to a lawyer to correct ownership documents and references to Parikh’s 33.36% share, supported Parikh’s claims.
• Misuse of Funds: Evidence showed Thakkar diverted Parikh’s investments to his personal business, suggesting deceitful intent.

The Defendants raised three specific challenges:

• Origin of the Promise: They argued that others, not Thakkar, made the ownership promise. The court rejected this, citing Parikh’s testimony and Thakkar’s emails.
• Specificity and Intent: They claimed the promises were too vague and not made with intent to deceive. The court found the promises specific enough (a one-third stake for investments) and Thakkar’s failure to act, despite his admitted ability, suggested no intent to perform.
• Justifiable Reliance: They argued Parikh, a seasoned entrepreneur, should have known Thakkar couldn’t transfer ownership. Thakkar’s own testimony that he could transfer interests defeated this argument.

The court also dismissed a statute of frauds defense, noting that Parikh’s partial performance (advancing $145,000 in notes and $2 million in expenses) satisfied an exception to the statute (Metzgar v. Reserve Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 404 (1979)).

2. Alleged Inflammatory Conduct By Parikh’s Counsel

The Defendants claimed that Parikh’s counsel “inflamed the jury” by introducing irrelevant evidence of Thakkar’s history of litigated business debts, violating OCGA § 9-10-185, which requires courts to prevent prejudicial statements not in evidence. The court found no violation.

Parikh cross-examined Thakkar about his debt-related litigation to show a pattern of fraudulent behavior, relevant to both intent (under OCGA § 24-4-404(b)) and punitive damages. The trial court had pre-approved this evidence in the pretrial order, finding it admissible to prove Thakkar’s “pattern of fraud, deceit, trickery, breaches of contract, breaches of fiduciary duties, and all manner of misfeasance and malfeasance.” The Defendants’ choice not to bifurcate the punitive damages phase allowed this evidence in the main trial.

The court distinguished this case from Sangster v. Dujinski (264 Ga. App. 213 (2003)), where counsel repeatedly referenced inadmissible evidence despite a court order. Here, the evidence was admissible, and the trial court properly managed the proceedings, even admonishing the jury that attorneys’ statements are not evidence. The Defendants’ real objection was to the evidence’s relevance, not its existence, but the court upheld the trial court’s discretion (Urban Med. Hosp. v. Seay, 179 Ga. App. 874, 876 (1986)).

3. Punitive Damages: A Constitutional Overreach

The Defendants challenged the $65 million punitive damages award on multiple grounds, but the court focused on its constitutionality, vacating it as “grossly excessive” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)).

a-c. Preliminary Arguments

• Fraud Claim Validity: The Defendants reiterated that the fraud claim lacked evidence, but the court rejected this for reasons stated in Division 1.
• Punitive Conduct: They argued there was insufficient evidence of willful misconduct, malice, or fraud to justify punitive damages under OCGA § 51-12-5.1(b). The court found evidence of Thakkar’s intentional deceit, promising ownership, failing to deliver despite his ability, diverting funds, and a history of similar litigation, sufficient to support punitive damages.
• Statutory Cap: The Defendants claimed the $250,000 cap on punitive damages (OCGA § 51-12-5.1(g)) applied, but the court upheld the jury’s finding of specific intent to harm, which removes the cap (OCGA § 51-12-5.1(f)).

d. Constitutional Analysis The court conducted a de novo review using the three BMW guideposts to assess whether the punitive damages were grossly excessive (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003)):

• Reprehensibility: The court deemed Thakkar’s fraud reprehensible but not extraordinarily so. The harm was economic, not physical, affecting only Parikh, a financially secure cardiologist. While Thakkar’s history of litigation suggested a pattern, there was no clear evidence that all prior suits involved fraud. Only the element of intentional deceit strongly applied, making the $65 million award disproportionate.
• Ratio: The 1:100 ratio of compensatory ($650,000) to punitive ($65 million) damages far exceeded the single-digit ratios typically upheld under due process (State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425). Given the substantial compensatory award and the economic nature of the harm, this ratio was excessive.
• Comparable Sanctions: Civil and criminal penalties for fraud, such as a $5,000 fine for credit card fraud (OCGA § 16-9-38), were significantly lower than $65 million, further indicating excessiveness.

The court also criticized Parikh’s argument that a massive award was needed for publicity to warn others about Thakkar, noting that punitive damages aim to punish and deter the defendant, not generate headlines. Concluding that the award violated due process, the court vacated it and remanded for further proceedings.

4. Attorney Fees

The Defendants challenged the $525,025.36 attorney fees award under OCGA § 13-6-11, which allows fees for bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, or causing unnecessary trouble and expense. They argued there was no evidence of bad faith and that “expenses of litigation” excludes attorney fees. The court rejected both:

• Bad Faith: Thakkar’s knowledge that he could transfer ownership but refusal to do so, forcing Parikh to sue, constituted bad faith (City of Lilburn v. Astra Group, 286 Ga. App. 568, 570 (2007)).
• Statutory Interpretation: Over 120 years of precedent, from Traders’ Ins. Co. v. Mann (118 Ga. 381 (1903)) to Taylor v. Devereux Foundation (316 Ga. 44 (2023)), confirms that OCGA § 13-6-11 includes attorney fees.

Judge Dillard’s Concurrence Dubitante: A Principled Skepticism

Presiding Judge Dillard fully concurred in Divisions 1, 2, 3(a-c), and 4 but expressed reservations in Division 3(d) through a concurrence dubitante, a rare judicial stance indicating agreement with the outcome but doubt about the reasoning (Benefield v. Tominich, 308 Ga. App. 605, 611 n.28 (2011)). His concurrence centers on his alignment with Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in BMW v. Gore (517 U.S. 559, 598-607 (1996)), challenging the federal judiciary’s role in policing punitive damages under the Due Process Clause.

Scalia’s Dissent And Dillard’s View

In BMW, the U.S. Supreme Court held that grossly excessive punitive damages violate due process, establishing the three guideposts used in Thakkar. Justice Scalia, dissenting, argued that this was an overreach:

• State Sovereignty: Scalia viewed the majority’s intervention as an “unjustified incursion” into state authority, asserting that states should regulate punitive damages through their own laws and judicial processes (BMW, 517 U.S. at 598).
• Procedural, Not Substantive, Due Process: Scalia contended that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees only procedural fairness (e.g., a chance to contest damages in court), not substantive protections against “unfair” awards. He rejected the idea that the Clause is a “secret repository of substantive guarantees against unfairness” (id. at 598-99).
• Judicial Restraint: Scalia argued that a jury’s punitive damages award, subject to state judicial review for reasonableness, satisfies due process. There is no federal guarantee that the award itself be reasonable (id. at 599).

Judge Dillard echoes these concerns, lamenting that BMW’s framework has not been overturned. He aligns with Scalia’s view that the Due Process Clause should not be used to second-guess state jury awards, calling BMW an “ill-founded decision” that belongs in the “dustbin of jurisprudential history.” Dillard’s concurrence dubitante signals his hope that the Supreme Court will reconsider BMW, restoring greater deference to state processes.

Implications Of Dillard’s Stance

Dillard’s concurrence is more than academic; it reflects a broader debate about federalism and judicial overreach:

• Federal vs. State Power: If BMW were overturned, states like Georgia could set punitive damages caps (or none at all) without federal oversight, potentially leading to larger awards but also greater variability across jurisdictions.
• Judicial Role: Dillard’s skepticism highlights tension between judicial activism and restraint. By questioning BMW’s substantive due process approach, he advocates for a narrower judicial role, leaving policy questions to legislatures and state courts.
• Practical Impact: In Thakkar, Dillard’s reservations don’t change the outcome, the award was vacated but they signal to practitioners that some judges may resist expansive federal review of damages, potentially influencing future arguments.

Takeaways For Georgia Litigants And Attorneys

For those navigating personal injury, fraud, or business disputes in Georgia, Thakkar v. Parikh offers critical lessons:

• Fraud Claims Require Robust Evidence: Parikh’s success hinged on clear testimony, corroborating emails, and Thakkar’s damaging admissions. Defendants must counter such evidence at trial, as Thakkar’s failure to do so was fatal.
• Punitive Damages Face Constitutional Scrutiny: While Georgia allows uncapped punitive damages for specific intent to harm (OCGA § 51-12-5.1(f)), awards must pass BMW’s guideposts. Attorneys seeking large awards should tie them closely to reprehensibility and avoid arguments (like publicity) that stray from deterrence.
• Attorney Fees Are Broadly Available: OCGA § 13-6-11 remains a powerful tool for plaintiffs facing bad-faith defendants, with a century of precedent supporting attorney fees as “expenses of litigation.”
• Judicial Philosophy Matters: Judge Dillard’s concurrence underscores that judges’ views on constitutional issues, like substantive due process, can shape case outcomes. Litigants should anticipate such perspectives in appellate strategy.

Conclusion

Thakkar v. Parikh is a fascinating case that blends the drama of a broken business deal with high-stakes legal questions about fraud and punitive damages. The Court of Appeals’ decision affirms the strength of Georgia’s fraud and attorney fees laws while reinforcing federal limits on excessive punitive awards. Judge Dillard’s concurrence dubitante adds a layer of intellectual intrigue, challenging the judiciary to reconsider its role in policing state damages awards.

As a Georgia personal injury lawyer, I see this case as a reminder of the importance of thorough evidence, strategic trial decisions, and awareness of constitutional boundaries. Whether you’re a plaintiff seeking justice or a defendant facing a hefty verdict, understanding cases like Thakkar is crucial to navigating Georgia’s legal landscape.

For more insights or assistance with personal injury or fraud claims, contact George Creal at www.georgialawyer.com